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Abstract 
This document presents a high-level overview of the threats to safety-
relevant computer-based systems, including (1) a description of the 
introduction and activation of physical and logical faults, (2) the 
propagation of their effects, and (3) function-level and component-level 
error and failure mode models.  These models can be used in the definition 
of fault hypotheses (i.e., assumptions) for threat-risk mitigation strategies.  
This document is a contribution to a guide currently under development 
that is  intended to provide a general technical foundation for designers 
and evaluators of safety-relevant systems. 
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1.   Introduction 
An aircraft consists of a collection of systems performing a wide variety of functions with different 
safety criticality levels.  The aviation industry is continuing a decades-old trend of adopting increasingly 
sophisticated computer-based technology to implement aircraft functionality.  Modern aircraft are highly 
complex, functionally integrated, network-centric systems of systems [1].  The design and analysis of 
distributed-computation aircraft systems are inherently complex activities.  Ensuring that such systems are 
safe and comply with existing airworthiness regulations is costly and time-consuming as the level of rigor 
in the development process, especially the validation and verification activities, is determined by 
considerations of system complexity and safety criticality.  A significant degree of care and deep insight 
into the operational principles of these systems are necessary to ensure adequate coverage of all design 
implications relevant to system safety.   
The validation and verification (V&V) and the certification of complex computer-based systems, 
including safety-critical systems, are recognized problems of national significance [2], [3], [4].  The 
challenges in assuring the design and safety of systems require considerable attention and financial 
investment [5].  As aircraft system complexity continues to increase, the V&V and certification costs and 
related programmatic risks can provide a basis against the development and implementation of new 
capabilities [6].  Such obstacles against innovation pose a threat to national competitiveness and can hinder 
the proposed operational improvements to the National Airspace System (NAS) that are intended to 
increase capacity and flexibility and reduce costs, but would also increase the complexity of airborne and 
ground aviation systems [7].  There are initiatives underway to produce methods, tools, and techniques that 
enable predictable, timely, and cost-effective complex systems development [8].  NASA aims to identify 
technical risks and to provide knowledge to safely manage the increasing complexity in the design and 
operation of vehicles in the air transportation system.  For this goal, multidisciplinary tools and techniques 
are being developed to assess and ensure safety in complex aviation systems and enable needed 
improvements to the NAS. 
This document is a contribution to a design and evaluation guide currently under development.  The 
guide is intended to (1) provide insight into the system safety domain, (2) present a general technical 
foundation for designers and evaluators of safety-relevant systems, and (3) serve as a reference for designers 
to formulate well-reasoned safety-related claims and arguments and identify evidence that can substantiate 
the claims.  That evidence forms a basis for demonstrating compliance with certification regulations.  The 
generation of such evidence is a major objective of a system development process.  This work is part of an 
ongoing effort to enable sound assurance of safety-related properties of computer-based aircraft systems by 
developing an effective capability to model and reason about the safety implications of system requirements 
and design. 
This document provides a high-level overview of threats to safety-relevant computer-based systems, 
covering the introduction and activation of physical and logical faults and the propagation of their effects.  
Function-level and component-level error and failure mode models are presented.  These models can be 
used in the definition of fault hypotheses (i.e., assumptions) for threat-risk mitigation strategies.  That will 
be the topic of the next contribution to the design and evaluation guide. 
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2.   System Safety Threats 
System-safety threats are processes or phenomena that can cause operational hazards.  The type of 
hazard considered in this paper is the failure of a given computational system, henceforth referred to as the 
system of interest (SOI).  The failure threats can occur during development, production, manufacturing, 
operation, or maintenance of the SOI, and they can be endogenous or exogenous to the system.  This section 
examines the relation between threats and failures and introduces generic functional failure models 
applicable at every level in a design hierarchy.  These models can be used in the analysis of functional and 
non-functional (i.e., quality) properties of a system.   
 
2.1.   Threats-and-Effects Model 
A system is an entity with a purpose achieved through the interactions of its internal components with 
each other and with the external environment.  A system has a hierarchical structure in which the 
components are themselves systems (i.e., sub-systems) in a sequence of recursive composition that 
continues until primitive atomic components are reached whose internal structure is irrelevant or unknown.  
A system can be conceptualized as consisting of three layers (also referred to as universes or domains) [9]: 
information (i.e., data sets and streams), logical (i.e., computation and communication algorithms), and 
physical (i.e., concrete physical substrate).  A layer is also referred to as a domain or universe.  A system 
has a hierarchical organizational structure at each of these layer.  The mapping of components between 
layers can be one-to-many, many-to-one, and/or one-to-one. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
A generic failure model for computational systems is similar to a hazard scenario model [10] and is 
based on the concept of a causal chain of events.  An event is a change in state at a specified location.  
Figure 1 illustrates a notional example of the system failure model, where Ci.state represents the state of a 
component i.  Under this failure model, Initiating Unintended Events (IUE) propagate effects through 
coupling paths until they reach system outputs as Terminal Unintended Events (TUE).  This conceptual 
system failure model is an abstraction of the propagation mechanism from IUEs to TUEs.  The IUEs can 
originate within or outside the system boundary.  The coupling paths can be either intended (i.e., in-band 
[11]) interaction paths defined by the system design, or unintended (i.e., out-of-band [11]) interaction paths 
that have been assumed not to exist in the design and description of the system (i.e., interaction paths that 
 
   
 
 
   
 
  
   
 
 
 
Figure 1: Notional Example of System Failure Model as an Event Chain 
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violate coupling assumptions).  The value and timing characteristics of propagated effects are dependent 
on the structure and state of the system.  The effects may be delayed until the system state is favorable for 
propagation.  An event is said to be active (or live) when it is propagating effects; otherwise, the event is 
said to be dormant (or latent) [12].  Under the event chain model, a system failure occurs when the 
delivered service is not as intended due the effects of IUEs.  Note in Figure 1 that IUE effects can propagate 
simultaneously through multiple paths.  In general, event chains do not necessarily propagate effects 
forward in linear patterns, but may actually have complex propagation patterns with divergent and 
convergent paths as well as forward and backward paths (e.g., consider state machines with feedback loops).   
The general system structure and layers can be examined to gain further insight into this system failure 
model.  Figure 2 illustrates an example of a failure event chain for a fragment of a hierarchical structure in 
the logical layer of a system.  The clouds in Figure 2 represent effect propagation paths in the system.  In 
this example, an IUE occurs at point A and its effects propagate to output point B when the state of 
component V is favorable for such propagation.  A TUE at point B constitutes a failure of Component V.  
In Component W, the effects of the unintended event at point B may propagate if the state of component 
W enables it.  Component W experiences a service failure if unintended events reach the output at point C.   
 
 
 
 
 
In Figure 2, the event propagation mechanisms between points A, B, and C are couplings between these 
points.  These define relations between events at points A and B, B and C, and A and C.  Variability and 
uncertainties in these relations and in the states and events (i.e., state transitions) at initiating points 
influence the variability and uncertainties at terminal points.  Hence, the system failure risk (i.e., severity 
and likelihood of failure events) can be mitigated by controlling the initiating events and the coupling 
mechanisms (both intended and unintended), including intermediate events between initiating and terminal 
event points.  This insight will be explored further in future sections of the design and evaluation guide. 
The threats of interest here are processes or phenomena that can cause system functional failures by 
introducing IUEs.  These threats can be external or internal to the SOI.  A functional failure occurs when 
the SOI does not deliver the intended service as reflected in the output data in the information layer.  This 
can be caused by IUEs in the logical layer, or by IUEs in the physical layer that propagate effects through 
the logical layer and on to the information layer.  An IUE is the result of a physical or logical defect caused 
by a threat.  Such a physical or logical defect in a system is called a fault.  Threats are fault sources (i.e., 
causes).  We refer to threats that cause physical faults as physical threats, and those that cause logical 
faults as logical threats.  Faults in the logical layer can cause errors in the information layer (i.e., data with 
unintended value and/or timing) that can propagate to system outputs where they manifest as failures.  An 
error is essentially a fault (i.e., a defect) in the information layer.  Avizienis et al. [13] and Parhami [14] 
[15] provide additional information on the fault-error-failure propagation model. 
  
  
   
Figure 2: An Event Chain in a Fragment of a Logical Hierarchical Composition  
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Figure 3 illustrates some possible fault introduction targets (or victims) of physical and logical threats.  
The oval-ended arrows identify direct targets of threats where faults are introduced.  As in Figure 2, a cloud 
in Figure 3 represents a coupling mechanism between parts of a system.  In this figure, a group of related 
components is called an assembly.  The classification of fault introduction targets is based on three 
characterizing dimensions: layer (physical or logical), part (component or assembly), and count (single or 
multiple).  A fault in a component afflicts that specific component, while a fault in an assembly afflicts the 
integration of all the contained components (i.e., the assembly as a whole is faulty rather than just parts of 
it).  A threat can directly afflict individual or multiple parts, which can be either components or assemblies.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As illustrated in Figure 3, in this model a threat can generate faults directly or indirectly (as a sequential 
or cascade propagation of effects) in one or more parts of the system.  A fault directly caused by a threat is 
 
   
   
   
   
  
 
 
   
   
   
   
   
  
 
  
 
  
  
   
       
       
       
Figure 3: Examples of Fault Introduction Targets from Physical and Logical Threats 
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a primary fault.  A fault in one component or assembly can propagate effects through coupling 
mechanisms to other components or assemblies on the same layer.  Physical faults can also propagate effects 
to the logical layer.  Faults (i.e., defects) that occur as a result of propagation from one part to another are 
called secondary faults.  Common-cause (i.e., dependent or related) faults in the physical or logical 
layers can be multiple primary faults caused by the same threat event, or a primary fault with its propagated 
secondary faults.  Common-cause faults require special consideration in the design of threat mitigation 
strategies that are based on assumed bounds on the number of simultaneously active faults. 
Additional information on fault and failure propagation modeling and analysis is available from a 
multitude of sources.  SAE Aerospace Recommended Practice ARP-1834A [16] describes recommended 
practice for functional failure analysis of digital systems and equipment.  Beland and BonJour [17] describe 
an approach for modeling and analysis of functional failure in airborne electronic hardware.  ARP-4761 
[18] describes approaches for the analysis of failure effects in aircraft systems.  Leveson [19] provides an 
extensive and insightful presentation of system safety, including accident modeling and analysis.  Most of 
the information available on common-cause failure is in the context of nuclear power plants.  Documents 
from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) [20], U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission [21] 
[22] [23], Rutledge [24] [25], Stott et al. [26], and Kaufman et al. [27], among many others, provide insight 
into this type of fault and the mathematical models of their propagation mechanisms and effects. 
 
2.2.   Fault Introduction 
In this section, we consider the (unintended) introduction of primary faults and the generation of 
secondary faults within the physical and logical layers or across from the physical layer to the logical layer.  
Primary faults can be introduced during development, production, manufacturing, operation, or 
maintenance of a system.  We divide the threat and fault spaces along two dimensions: life cycle phase 
(non-operational or operational) and layer (physical or logical).  The structure of the threat and fault sets 
(or spaces) is illustrated in Table 1 and Figure 4.  Non-operational faults are caused by (non-operational) 
threats during development, production, manufacturing, refinement, or maintenance of a system.  These 
can be logical or physical faults.  Operational faults are caused by (operational) threats when the system 
is in operation.  We assume here that the logic design of a safety-relevant system remains unchanged during 
operation.  Hence, only physical primary faults can be introduced during operation, though the generation 
of secondary faults in the logical layer during operation is possible.  Avizienis et al. [13], Suri et al. [28], 
Heimerdinger and Weinstock [29], and Hugue [30] propose additional fault classification criteria for more 
refined taxonomies. 
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Table 1: Structure of Threat and Fault Spaces 
Threat and Fault Spaces Layer 
Logical Physical 
Life Cycle Phase Non-Operational Non-Operational Logical 
Threats and Faults 
Non-Operational Physical 
Threats and Faults 
Operational [ Assumed Empty ] Operational Physical 
Threats and Faults 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Structure of the System Fault Space 
 
2.2.1.   Non-Operational Threats 
Non-operational threats are processes or phenomena that can introduce logical and physical faults into 
the system during non-operational phases of the life cycle.  These phases include development, production, 
manufacturing, refinement, installation, and maintenance.   
System development can be viewed as a process of making a hierarchy of decisions such that early high-
level, broad-scope decisions provide a basis and context for later lower level and narrower-scope decisions.  
From this perspective, mistakes in early design decisions can propagate effects in the form of additional 
wrong decisions and faulty (i.e., defective) design and implementation to later stages of the development 
and implementation.  These mistakes can affect the functional, physical, and allocated system architectures, 
as well as the hardware and software, and their integration.  Design and implementation refinements after 
initial system deployment can introduce faults in a similar way as the original development.  Faults 
introduced during development and refinement can be caused by, for example, incorrect or incomplete 
requirements, incorrect interpretation of requirements, inconsistent assumptions in the design of 
components, and random design and implementation mistakes.  Note that system requirements result from 
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identified customer needs as well as development decisions, and defects in requirements can lead to defects 
in design (i.e., secondary development faults). 
Manufacturing and production defects, particularly in hardware, can occur in every aspect of the 
product.  This includes things such as packaging and soldering defects, selection of wrong materials, 
damage due to electrostatic discharge (ESD) or electrical overstress, and defective parts (e.g., resistors, 
capacitors, and cables).  Integrated circuits may have defects of various kinds such as internal hard defects 
with secondary faults that manifest in the logic at the time of manufacturing, weaknesses that can cause 
failures later during operation by mechanisms such as electro-migration, or heat-induced mechanical stress 
that can cause fractures.   
Installation and maintenance of computer-based systems consists primarily of placement and routing of 
components and cables, troubleshooting, and component replacement.  Examples of how these activities 
can introduce faults include incorrect wiring or voltage, replacement of components with others with the 
wrong part number, obstructed airflow, debris that can cause short circuits or overheating, or physical 
damage to components from impact or mechanical stress during handling or installation. 
The quality assurance process are the planned and systematic activities intended to provide adequate 
confidence that defects have been prevented or corrected in operational products.  Quality assurance is 
applicable to every aspect of a system and can include activities to verify the processes for creating and 
sustaining a product, as well as activities to validate and verify the product itself.  The level of rigor in 
quality assurance is determined by the criticality of a system or components relative to the desired attributes.  
The overall level of quality assurance effort is directly related to the level of rigor and the complexity of 
the product.  The complexity is related to the number and variety of components and relations in the system.  
In general, for modern highly complex and integrated computational systems, quality assurance activities 
cannot guarantee perfect products, and thus, residual defects may remain in operational products.  An 
analysis performed by Stecklein et al. shows that the cost to fix development faults grows exponentially 
thought the life cycle of a system [31].  Thus, from a cost perspective, the quality assurance process should 
aim to prevent and correct development mistakes, and non-operational faults in general, as close as possible 
to their time of occurrence. 
2.2.2.   Operational Threats 
There are two kinds of operational threats: endogenous processes and exogenous processes.  It is 
assumed here that the logic design of a safety-relevant system remains unchanged while the system is in 
operation.  Hence, operational threats can only cause physical faults.  Endogenous processes can cause 
physical faults by mechanisms such as electromagnetic interference, heat-induced stress, and random 
failures of integrated circuits.  Exogenous process can cause faults mainly through violation of 
environmental assumptions that expose a system to stresses beyond its tolerance capabilities.  
Environmental condition standards such as RTCA DO-160 [32] define minimum test conditions 
representative of what an airborne system may encounter in operation.  Some of the test conditions in DO-
160 include temperature, humidity, vibration, sand and dust, fungus, magnetic effects, voltage spikes, 
radiated radio frequency (RF) electromagnetic energy, lightning, icing, and electrostatic discharge.  High-
energy particle radiation (e.g., neutrons) can also cause random faults and latch-up (i.e., internal short 
circuits caused by the activation of parasitic semiconductor structures) in integrated circuits [13]. 
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2.2.3.   Physical Faults 
Physical faults (i.e., defects in the physical layer of a system) can be the primary and secondary effects 
of both non-operational and operational threats.  Non-operational threat events in the form of design, 
implementation, and manufacturing errors are believed to be the most likely to cause multiple dependent 
physical faults, while operational threat events are usually assumed to cause random physical faults in single 
components.  Quality assurance in non-operational life cycle phases is normally expected to provide 
adequate confidence that non-operational physical faults are non-existent or extremely unlikely.  However, 
the physical fault arrival rate for individual electronics components due to operational threats tends to be 
constant and non-negligible in the domain of safety-relevant systems.  The use of high quality components 
is generally not sufficient to mitigate the physical fault risks in safety-relevant systems, and redundancy-
based mitigation strategies are required to achieve adequately low risk levels.  Some primary physical faults 
may cause additional secondary physical faults as well as logical faults, which can then cause errors in the 
information layer and ultimately component and system failures.  Special attention is required to mitigate 
the risk of non-operational and operational single threat events causing multiple faults as this situation can 
exceed the tolerance of redundancy-based mitigations and quickly exhaust spare resources [18].  Careful 
analysis and design is required to understand and minimize the physical fault introduction and propagation 
mechanisms, especially for unintended and unexpected coupling paths [33] [34]. 
2.2.4.   Logical Faults 
Logical faults are defects in the processes of computation and communication of data (i.e., defects in 
the logical layer of a system).  These can be both primary and secondary effects of non-operational threats 
and secondary effects of operational threats.  Logical faults are a special concern in complex and highly 
integrated systems as neither process-based nor product-based quality assurance, or a combination of the 
two, can guarantee complete absence of logical faults in deployed systems.  A particular concern is that 
individual design and implementation threats can cause multiple faults in different components, including 
redundant components intended to mitigate fault risks.  Common-cause faults require careful and deliberate 
consideration in safety-relevant systems whose overall quality assurance argument is supported by 
assumptions of fault independence and non-simultaneous activation of logical faults in redundant 
components.  Here, too, careful analysis and design is required to understand and minimize the impact of 
logical faults caused by unexpected physical mechanisms [33] [34]. 
Additional information on logical faults, especially software faults, is available from many other 
sources.  Chu et al. [35] present failure taxonomies for hardware and software in digital systems.  Riecks et 
al. [36] describe a taxonomy with 16 failure classes and 114 fundamental failure types.  Hayes [37] 
introduced a requirement fault taxonomy for software systems.  Munson et al. [38] have proposed a 
quantifiable definition for software faults. 
 
2.3.   Logical Fault Activation and Effects Propagation 
The service provided by an SOI consists of a sequence of service items (i.e., data items) that are 
characterized by a value and time of occurrence.  An SOI experiences a service failure when the delivered 
service is incorrect.  Under the failure model described here, an SOI service failure occurs when errors in 
the information layer propagate to the output ports of the SOI in the form of service items that are incorrect 
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in their value or time of delivery.  These errors are caused by faults in the logical layer of the SOI. 
The scope of logical fault effects depends on the structure and state of the SOI.  A logical fault will 
remain dormant until the state of the system is favorable for the propagation of effects in the form of errors 
in the information layer.  Errors can occur in control and data items and can impact the control flow and 
the data flow of the SOI.  Errors can propagate through intended and unintended coupling paths, which are 
dependencies between elements in the SOI.  Intended coupling paths involve the three basic functional 
behaviors in a system: data transformation, data storage, and data transfer.  In addition, errors can result 
from unintended data or timing interactions between components, such as when there is sharing of system 
computation or communication resources.  
Kopetz [39] defines safety as the probability that a system will survive for a given time interval without 
a critical failure mode (i.e., a failure mode that can lead to catastrophic consequences).  Hence, from a safety 
perspective, we are interested in the probability distribution of SOI failure modes.  In particular, we want 
the safety risk to be below a predetermined upper limit with an inverse relation between the likelihood and 
severity of failure modes.  The development of a safety-relevant system is focused on ensuring that the 
failure characteristics of the SOI satisfy this risk constraint.  The ability to prevent, detect, and contain the 
propagation of incorrect service items at the source and the users is a critical determining factor of failure 
modes and the safety risk level of the SOI.   
 
2.4.   Functional Failure Model 
We are primarily concerned with safety-relevant systems whose failure can cause or contribute to 
damage or injury to people, property, and the natural environment.  An SOI, which can be a top-level system 
or an internal component of a system, is designed to implement data processing functions allocated to it 
and realized as a service delivered to its environment in the form of a sequence of service items (i.e., data 
items), each characterized by a value and time of occurrence.  Because an SOI only processes data, it cannot 
directly cause physical damage or injury.  Thus, safety in the context of the SOI is about the operational 
and failure attributes of the delivered service from the perspective of potential effects in its operational 
environment.   
This section and the next describe two levels of failure models intended for analysis of the propagation 
of failure effects.  As functional and architectural design are primarily concerned with external and internal 
interface design, the failure models describe possible manifestations at interfaces.  The functional failure 
model is from the perspective of a top-level system function at the external interface to the environment.  
The component failure model builds on the functional failure model by taking a structural system 
perspective with a source component delivering a service to multiple users (i.e., receivers).  The models 
provide insight into the kinds of functional attributes that are critical in the analysis and mitigation of fault 
risks.   
Figure 5 illustrates a high-level abstraction of the SOI as a service provider to its environment.  The 
functional failure model is applicable to this level of abstraction of the SOI.  We first consider an error 
model for individual service items.  This is then applied in the definition of service failure modes as 
sequences of service items.  This modeling approach is similar to the one presented by Powell [40].   
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2.4.1.   Source-Based versus Receiver-Based Failure Model 
The SOI function can be modeled as being in one of three conditions:  
 Operational: Operating as intended; 
 Loss of Function (LoF): Not operating; and  
 Malfunction (MF): Operating incorrectly (i.e., anomalous).   
These basic conditions serve as a guide for other models presented in this report.  Normally the 
functional condition is assessed at the source, but for the analysis of failure effects, it can be advantageous 
to assess the condition as perceived at the receiver.  Recall from the event chain model, that the propagation 
of failure effects depends on the state of components downstream of the Initiating Unintended Event, which 
in this case is the functional failure of the SOI.  There is a mapping, not necessarily one-to-one, between 
the functional condition at the source and the perceived condition at the receiver.  In the following sections, 
the functional condition classification is based on the perception (i.e., the effect) at the receiver.  This 
simplifies the architecture-level abstract modeling of first-order functional failure effects (i.e., at the 
immediate direct receiver).  However, analyses of the causes of failure would have to consider the relation 
between source-based and receiver-based functional condition classification. 
2.4.2.   Functional Error Model 
The classification of service item errors from a functional perspective is based on whether they can cause 
other errors in the environment.  There are two types of errors: 
 Passive Error: The value or time of the service item is erroneous, but this does not propagate additional 
(information) errors in the environment; and 
 Active Error: The value or time of the service item is erroneous, and this may propagate additional 
(information) errors in the environment. 
This classification is intended for abstract fault and failure effects analyses, and as such, it does not 
specify the nature of the errors or their effects propagation characteristics.  Note that the definitions are 
based on the propagation of effects in the form of information errors in the environment.  Time integration 
effects in dynamic environment processes are not in the scope of this definition.  The model also does not 
specify if the containment of error effects is implicit or explicit, which depends on whether a deliberate 
action is taken at the SOI or the environment to prevent the propagation of undesired effects.  Also, notice 
that the passive and active error classification is based on whether an error has the potential to propagate 
 
   
Figure 5: Abstraction of SOI as Service Provider to its Environment 
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effects, not whether effects will actually propagate.  This convention is aligned with the conservative 
approach in safety-relevant systems.   
Based on this error classification, a service item can be classified as: 
 Correct (or Valid) Item: The value and time attributes of the service item are as intended; 
 Passive-Error Item: The service item is erroneous in value or time, but it does not propagate errors in 
the environment; and 
 Active-Error Item: The service item is erroneous in value or time and it may propagate errors in the 
environment. 
It is implicit in the classification that a correct item does not propagate errors in the environment.  Also, 
note that the classification is based on guarantees.  A passive-error item is guaranteed not to propagate 
errors in the environment, but there is no guarantee for an active-error item.   
2.4.3.   Functional Failure Mode Model 
Functional failure modes apply to sequences of service items.  These failure modes can also be referred 
to as functional health modes.  The categories of failure modes are: 
 Operational: The service items are correct. 
 Failed-Passive: The service items are correct, or passive-error, or a combination of these. 
 Failed-Active: The service items are correct, passive-error, or active-error, or a combination of these. 
This functional failure model defines a hierarchy of increasingly permissive behavior in which an 
operational function is the most constrained as it is defined (and guaranteed) as not having erroneous items, 
and failed-active mode is the least constrained and, in fact, arbitrary with possibly active-error service items.  
Figure 6 illustrates the implication graph for this failure mode model.  From a safety perspective, the 
operational mode is the most predictable and least severe mode, and failed-active mode is unpredictable 
and the most severe mode due to a higher potential for severe effects in the environment.  The failed-passive 
failure mode is a controlled failure and corresponds to a Loss of Function (LoF).  The failed-active failure 
mode is an uncontrolled failure and corresponds to a Malfunction (MF). 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Figure 6: Implication Graph for Functional Failure Modes 
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2.4.4.   Transition Model for Functional Failure Modes 
A functional failure is an event in which a function transitions out of the operational mode.  In general, 
a safety-relevant system needs to withstand one or more faults in an operational mode before experiencing 
a failure.  This operational fault tolerance is a fault-count safety margin against failure.  When a functional 
failure event occurs, the severity of the failure depends on the characteristics of the environment and the 
mode and persistence (i.e., duration) of the failure.  For a given failure mode, the time to criticality (TTC) 
(also called the time to effect, TTE) is the minimum duration to reach a particular level of severity of 
effects.  If the system is able to recover (i.e., return to the operational mode) before the TTC, the effects of 
the failure event will not reach the worst-case level and the environment may recover back to normal or 
have a degraded but safe performance level.  The TTC is a source of real-time functional performance 
constraints (e.g., hard deadlines) in safety-relevant systems.  The TTC is effectively a time safety margin.   
Figure 7 illustrates an example transition model for functional failure modes.  In this figure, an 
operational safety margin of 0 means that a failure has occurred.  The Down transitions in the Operational 
Mode represent internal faults and the Up transitions represent recovery events.  Note that not all failures 
may be recoverable, and some failures may result in immediate severe consequences in the environment.  
From this figure, we can see that the primary characteristics for a failure scenario are: time-to-failure, 
failure modes, and time-to-recover.  The time-to-failure is related to the operational fault tolerance by 
means of the operational fault arrival rate (i.e., the time rate at which operational faults are introduced) 
and the fault activation rate (i.e., the time rate at which existing faults begin to generate and propagate 
errors). 
The illustration in the preceding Figure 5 represents a service relation between the SOI and its 
environment.  This relation is a dependence of the environment on the service of the SOI such that 
performance and safety in the environment depends to some degree on the quality of the service delivered 
by the SOI.  Avizienis et al. define dependability as the ability of a system to avoid service failures that 
are more frequent or more severe than is acceptable [41].  This means that a system is dependable if the 
risk of the dependence is lower than a maximum acceptable risk level (i.e., the boundary risk).  The 
dependability of the SOI is determined by the three characteristics stated above: time-to-failure, failure 
modes, and time-to-recover.  The time-to-failure characteristics determine the frequency of failures, and 
the failure mode and time-to-recover characteristics determine the severity of the failures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
  
 
    
  
    
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
Figure 7: Example of Funtional Failure Mode Transition Model 
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2.5.   Component Failure Model 
The component failure model builds on the functional failure model by taking a structural system 
perspective.  Here the source SOI is a system component that delivers a service to one or more user 
components.  This is illustrated in Figure 8.  The classification of SOI failure is based on the delivered 
service as perceived by the users through direct and independent inspection of service items at their 
respective communication interface.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.5.1.   Component Error Model for Single-User Service 
As illustrated in Figure 9, the component failure model assumes that user components monitor their 
inputs for errors using acceptance checks and that the data flowing down-stream includes the result of these 
checks.  Based on this user model, we can define two major types of service item errors at an individual 
user: 
 Detectable Error: The value or time of the service item is erroneous and this is detectable by the inline 
input error monitor at the user; and 
 Undetectable Error: The value or time of the service item is erroneous, but this is not detectable by 
the inline input error monitor at the user. 
 
 
 
 
 
   
  
  
   
Figure 8: Structural View of the SOI  Delivering a Service to Multiple Users 
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The detectability of an error determines the response of the user.  Implicit in the definition of detectable 
error is the exclusion of false-positive detection for correct items, which means that a correct item is not 
rejected by the input acceptance checks.  It is assumed that a missing item is detectable.  It is also assumed 
that a user will react to a detectable item error, whether it is a missing item or otherwise, by rejecting the 
item and taking action to contain the propagation of undesired effects.  No such assumption is made about 
the containment of undetectable-error effects.  Because of this, a detectable error is also called an omissive 
error and an undetectable error is called a transmissive error.   
Using these error types, a service item can be classified as follows: 
 Correct Item (C): The value and time attributes of the item are as intended; 
 Detectable-Error Item (D): The service item is erroneous in value or time and the errors are detectable; 
and 
 Undetectable-Error Item (U): The service item is erroneous in value or time, but the errors are 
undetectable.  
Detectable-error items and undetectable-error items are also called simply detectable items and 
undetectable items, respectively.  A detectable item is also called an omissive item and an undetectable 
item is called a transmissive item.  Correct, detectable, and undetectable items are denoted C, D, and U, 
respectively.  Correct C items and undetectable U items are called acceptable items, as they are not rejected 
(i.e., they are accepted) by the inline error monitor at the user. 
2.5.2.   Component Failure Mode Model for Single-User Service 
Failure modes apply to sequences of service items.  The categories of service modes for single-user 
service are: 
 Correct (C): The service items are correct. 
 Detectable (D): The service items are be correct or detectable, or a combination of these. 
 
  
   
Figure 9: Assumed Error Monitor at Input Port of User Component 
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 Undetectable (U): The service items are correct, detectable, or undetectable, or a combination of these. 
Notice that this classification defines increasing levels of permissiveness (and hence, uncertainty) in the 
items, such that the Detectable failure mode has more possible options (i.e., is less constrained) than Correct 
and the Undetectable failure mode is effectively arbitrary (i.e., it can have C, D, and U items).  The potential 
complexity of the failure modes increases with the increase in permissiveness.  Also, notice that the items 
are called and denoted based on their worst-case type of error relative to the presence of erroneous items 
and possible effects at the user component.  Figure 10 illustrates the implication relation for the failure 
modes such that the Correct mode category is contained in the Detectable mode category, which is itself 
contained in the Undetectable mode category.   
 
 
  
 
2.5.3.   Component Error Model for Multiple-User Service 
Multiple-user service is illustrated in Figure 8, where the number of user components is denoted n.  A 
multiple-user service item consists of n replicated single-user items.  The error model presented here for 
multi-user service is the Omissive-Transmissive Hybrid (OTH) fault model [42] [43].  Multiple-user 
service introduces the dimension of symmetry (i.e., consistency) to the characterization of service items.  A 
service item is symmetric if the items perceived by all the users are equal.  Equality can be exact or 
approximate (i.e., bounded difference) depending on the element of the service item (i.e., value or time) 
and the semantics (i.e., meaning) of the service.  Asymmetry among the users is a form of error and has the 
potential to propagate error effects in a system.  Generally, an asymmetric multi-user service item is more 
severe than a symmetric item.   
A multiple-user service item can be expressed as a vector X = (x1; x2 xn), where xi is the single-user 
item at user i.  In the OTH model, it is assumed that correct single-user items C at different users are equal 
(i.e., correct items are symmetric).  Likewise, all detectable single-user items D are equal.  Pairs of 
undetectable single-user items U may be either equal or unequal.  Unequal U items are denoted by different 
sub-scripts (e.g., Ui  Uj).  A correct C item and an undetectable U item may be either equal or unequal in 
value and/or time, depending on the semantics, but they are not the same with respect to correctness1.  The 
OTH error categories for a multiple-user service item are the following: 
 Correct (C): Every user accepts a correct single-user service item.   
 Omissive Symmetric (OS): Every user rejects its single-user service item. 
 Transmissive Symmetric (TS): Every user accepts an undetectable single-user service item, but all 
                                                          
 
1 For example, if integer values smaller than 5 are correct, values from 6 to 9 are incorrect but undetectable, and 
values that differ by 3 or less are equal, then a value of 4 is correct and 6 is undetectable, but 4 and 6 are equal. 
  
  
  
 
Figure 10: Implication Graph for Single-User Service Failure Modes 
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the single-user service items are equal. 
 Strictly Omissive Asymmetric (SOA): Some users reject their single-user service item and others 
accept a correct item.  
 Single-Data Omissive Asymmetric (SDOA): Some users reject their single-user service item and 
others accept an undetectable item, but all the accepted items are equal. 
 Transmissive Asymmetric (TA): The users have other patterns of service items. 
To gain insight into the OTH classification, we consider two levels of symmetry in multiple-user service 
items.  The first type of symmetry covers all the single-user items taken together.  We have overall 
symmetry if all the users receive equal service items, which can be C, D, or U.  Otherwise, the item has 
overall asymmetry.  These conditions are denoted Sn and An, respectively, as they apply to all n users taken 
together.  The second type of symmetry is item equality across accepting users (i.e., users with C or U 
items), which can range in number from 0 to n.  A multiple-user item has acceptable-item symmetry if 
the accepting users have equal items.  Otherwise, the multiple-user item has acceptable-item asymmetry.  
These are denoted SA and AA, respectively.  Notice that Sn implies SA, and AA implies An. 
The OTH classification can be decomposed based on three criteria: worst-case single-user error, overall 
symmetry, and acceptable-item symmetry.  The worst-case single-user error specifies the worst-case single-
user item at anyone of the users based on the severity ranking C < D < U (i.e., C is less severe than D and 
D is less severe than U).  CL denotes the condition that the worst-case single-user item error is C, DL denotes 
a worst-case of D, and UL denotes a worst-case of U.  For the overall and acceptable-item symmetry 
conditions, asymmetry is a more severe error than symmetry.  That is: Sn < An and SA < AA.  There is no 
clear way to compare the relative severity of single-user item errors and symmetry errors.  However, 
acceptable-item symmetry is clearly a stronger determinant of severity than overall symmetry, as the only 
way to have acceptable-item asymmetry is by having at least one undetected single-user error, which by 
definition has the potential to propagate errors.   
 Table 2 shows the decomposition of the OTH classification.  Figure 11 shows the severity relation for 
the OTH classification based on the severity of errors for the various decomposition criteria.  This is a 
partial-order relation as SOA and TS differ in the worst-case single-user error and the overall symmetry 
condition and there is no basis to rank the relative severity of these dimensions.  Note that TA error is the 
only kind with acceptable-item asymmetry, which is the most severe kind. 
Table 2: Decomposition of Omissive-Transmissive Hybrid Error Model by Error Dmensions 
OTH Category Worst-case 
Single-User 
Error 
Overall 
Symmetry 
Condition 
Acceptable-
Item Symmetry 
Condition 
Example 
Patterns 
For n = 4 
Correct (C) CL Sn SA (C; C; C; C) 
Omissive Symmetric (OS) DL Sn SA (D; D; D; D;) 
Strictly Omissive Asymmetric (SOA) DL An SA (C; C; D; D) 
Transmissive Symmetric (TS) UL Sn SA (U; U; U; U) 
Single-Data Omissive Asymmetric (SDOA) UL An SA (U; U; D; D) 
Transmissive Asymmetric (TA) UL An AA (C; U; D; D) 
(U1; U2; D; D) 
(U1; U1; U2; U3) 
  
17 
 
 
 
  
   
 
 
 
2.5.4.   Component Failure Modes for Multiple-User Service 
The failure modes for multiple-user service apply to sequences of service items and characterize the 
health status of the source component.  In this model, the failure modes are based on the OTH error model 
and the severity relation in Figure 11.  These OTH failure modes are defined as sets of permissible OTH 
errors and the names correspond to the most severe error in their set.  The categories of failure modes are: 
 Correct (C): The service items are correct. 
 Omissive Symmetric (OS): The service items are correct or omissive symmetric, or a combination of 
these. 
 Transmissive Symmetric (TS): The service items are correct, omissive symmetric, or transmissive 
symmetric, or a combination of these. 
 Strictly Omissive Asymmetric (SOA): The service items are correct, omissive symmetric, or strictly 
omissive asymmetric, or a combination of these.  
 Single-Data Omissive Asymmetric (SDOA): The service items are correct, omissive symmetric, 
transmissive symmetric, strictly omissive asymmetric, or single-data omissive asymmetric, or a 
combination of these. 
 Transmissive Asymmetric (TA): The service items are arbitrary (i.e., any combination of any items 
in the OTH classification).  This failure mode corresponds to a Byzantine fault [44] [33]. 
The severity relation for OTH failure modes is the same as for OTH errors (see Figure 11).  Also, notice 
that as the severity of the modes increases so does the permissiveness and uncertainty about the error 
category of the service items (i.e., higher severity modes are less constrained).  Figure 11 also captures the 
implication relation for the OTH failure modes. 
2.5.5.   Failure Models with Explicit Value and Time Dimensions 
It is possible to refine the component error models and failure mode models by introducing specific 
errors for the value and time elements of service items.  A good initial approach for this would be to leverage 
the value and time error models proposed by Powell [40].  Avizienis et al. [13] provide additional 
 
 
 
   
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Severity Relation for OTH Error Classification 
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information on service failure modes.  The refinement of the service error models is beyond the scope of 
this report.  Formal mathematical definitions of failure models are given by, for example, Powell [40] and 
Warns [45]. 
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3.   Final Remarks 
This document presented an overview of threats to safety-relevant computer-based systems.  Models of 
errors and failure modes for functions and components were also presented.  This document is intended to 
be part of a design guide for safety-relevant computer-based systems.  The next report in this series will 
address the topic of threat-risk mitigation. 
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